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The author is the Editor of MatrixMag and head of the Islamabad-based think tank CRSS. He is currently a Fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
Nations in transition, such as Bangladesh, face a difficult choice. Burdened by a bitter past and a turbulent present, they must decide whether to hold everyone accountable while protecting human rights or move on in the interest of political and economic stability. The former risks drawing the country into a cycle of political revenge. The latter runs counter to the aspirations of those who struggled against an oppressive regime. This is a major test for the new government: can Bangladesh move beyond personalised autocracy towards democratic governance that people consider legitimate, in the context of the “student revolution” of summer 2024?
The leaders of this revolution, along with many others across the political and social spectrum, refuse to forget the brutal victimisation and persecution of opposition politicians, media professionals, intellectuals and human rights defenders during Hasina’s rule, often with the active support of her loyalists at various levels.
This also raises the question of whether Prime Minister Tarique Rehman and his supporters can reduce the civil-military bureaucracy’s hold over the political economy as they pursue their reform agenda. Addressing the deeply rooted interests and legacy of the Awami League is a major challenge in an environment marked by political divisions and polarisation.
Tensions remain high in an environment that often turns hostile. This was reflected in the strong remarks made by Nahid Islam, convener of the National Citizen Party (NCP) and opposition Chief Whip, during a media interaction on October 28.
“If we let this government off the hook, we may have to face another fascism. We do not want to have to overthrow another fascist regime at the cost of 1,400 lives again,” warned Nahid Islam. He levelled several allegations against the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), saying that “the judiciary remains under the control of those in power, the (criminal) justice system has not been reformed, violence is rampant and the BNP-backed cadres are killing even their own party members” to settle personal scores.
In a reminder of the situation surrounding Pakistan’s ruling elites, Nahid Islam also described Bangladesh as a “mafia state”.
“Terrorists are armed, ministers and state ministers are also carrying weapons and this is what is called a mafia state,” he said, accusing the authorities of failing to arrest “godfathers of the (drug) trade, members of drug syndicates and political leaders linked to the business.”
These allegations may sound like an exaggerated charge sheet from a party that claims to represent the youth. However, their central concerns are difficult to dismiss and are common in countries undergoing political transitions. Islam’s remarks reflect growing doubts about whether Bangladesh’s post-uprising transition is producing meaningful reforms in law enforcement, the judiciary and democratic governance. The central argument of NCP members is that replacing one government is not enough if political patronage, violence, impunity and institutional weaknesses persist.
These concerns were clearly visible in discussions with Bangladeshi veterans and youth representatives during and on the sidelines of the recent annual Bay of Bengal conference. While geopolitics, interstate conflicts, the Iran-US-Israel war and the weakening of the UN-based global order dominated the proceedings, Bangladesh’s domestic political and social situation and its foreign relations also featured prominently in various sessions.
One of the major challenges facing Prime Minister Rehman is navigating the complex relationship between Pakistan and India. While many Bangladeshis, both inside and outside the government, want a fresh chapter in relations with Pakistan, the legacy of Hasina’s rule and the Awami League’s traditionally pro-India position remain obstacles to these aspirations.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy is gradually evolving, with a stated intention to engage with all regional countries. Dhaka is seeking broader engagement with China, Pakistan and the United States while maintaining a workable relationship with India. Its dependence on external trade and water supplies also leaves it vulnerable to sudden changes in US trade and aid policies.
Since the summer of 2024, Pakistan has reached out to Bangladesh to regain some of the diplomatic ground it had lost to India. Several diplomatic, defence and education-related initiatives have marked this effort, and a series of visits at different levels appears to have been well received. However, changing the deeply rooted pro-India mindset within the civil-military bureaucracy and governance structures will not be easy. The current government appears aware of these constraints and is therefore proceeding cautiously in its dealings with Pakistan. India, which surrounds Bangladesh on much of its land border and lies upstream of the country’s major rivers, remains a major concern.
That is why the present government is keen to focus on fixing its internal socio-economic problems and moderating the political toxicity (calls for accountability of the Hasina era brutalities) while trying to integrate partnerships with China, India and Pakistan without antagonising any regional power.
