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The author is the Editor of MatrixMag and head of the Islamabad-based think tank CRSS. He is currently a Fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
In his pithy but poignant commentary on the documentary film NAZA, British journalist Jonathan Cook identifies a malaise that helped lift Western civilisation to its current strength.
Today’s Western privileges were built on a long history of naked, racist colonialism – greed, pillage, slavery and genocide – that we have never truly renounced or forsaken.
NAZA is not just about Israel and Gaza. It is about the evil lurking in us all, says Cook, in a bitter reminder of the conflicts, land grabs and democratic repression taking place across the world.
What Cook points to is a world in disorder, propped up by a new form of colonialism: bigger powers relying on smaller, amenable states to pursue their objectives while practically ignoring the rule of law and human rights.
One wonders if the turmoil following the imposition of Governor’s Rule in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is also a manifestation of this global disorder and quest for absolute power.
The 48-member Area Representative and Development Council (ARDC), comprising tribal elders from 12 districts for looking after the ex-FATA regions, recalls a proposal discussed in the 1990s to replace the existing FATA administrative arrangement with a tribal advisory council. The crucial difference is that the 2018 merger brought these areas under the provincial system, with courts, police and other civilian institutions. Whether the new council will work within that framework or gradually undermine it by restoring the influence of federally appointed or politically favoured tribal intermediaries.
The composition of the council has already raised doubts about its acceptability. Five nominated members – Shahabuddin Khan of Bajaur, Baz Muhammad Khan of Bannu, Maulana Misbahullah Dawar of North Waziristan, Maulana Saleh Shah of Upper South Waziristan and Malik Jamil of Lower South Waziristan – had refused to join or distanced themselves from the arrangement. Can the council members exercise authority over communities whose members have not elected its representatives?
The concern is that the council could become a buffer between the authorities and the population. Critics also fear that a council dominated by status-quo figures could facilitate a return to the old FATA system in practice, even if the formal structures of provincial government remain in place.
Will the council be able to oppose decisions that conflict with local interests, or will they serve as intermediaries for policies they cannot meaningfully influence? For some tribal elders, participation may carry the risk of alienation from their own communities.
There is also a wider regional dimension. The former FATA lies along the porous and sensitive Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. Afghan objections to the Durand Line and the presence of militant groups on both sides of the border complicate security and governance. Calls for a return to the previous administrative arrangement have therefore been viewed by some observers in the context of regional political and security calculations. Suspicions have also surfaced whether the system responds to specific demand by the Haqqani network or the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)?
As for tackling terrorism, the military has for years played a leading role in border security, intelligence-based operations and counterterrorism, alongside the police and the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD). The relevant question is, what will change under the new arrangement? Will it improve coordination among civilian authorities, security agencies and local communities or will the council create another administrative layer without resolving the underlying problems?
Another reality facing Pakistan is that the TTP and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) operate through different organisational structures, although both pose serious security threats, presumably with the same objectives.
Neither the creation of an advisory council nor the appointment of tribal elders can, by itself, dismantle these networks which the authorities claim are foreign proxies.
Residents of Waziristan, Bajaur, Kurram and Khyber have reason to ask why militant violence continues despite the substantial presence of security forces. They also question how some militants appear able to move across the border or travel within the region despite repeated assurances about security arrangements.
Locals in these regions also point to another factor – the American quest for critical minerals. Since these areas possess a number of minerals and rare earth, they fear that the political changes are only meant to extract natural resources with the help of status-quo tribal elders. The former tribal districts contain mineral resources that could generate revenue and employment, but the distribution of benefits has long been contentious. Some residents suspect that the new council could facilitate resource extraction while keeping local communities at a distance from decisions about licences, royalties, ownership and environmental safeguards.
The central issue is therefore not simply whether Governor’s Rule is lawful or whether an advisory council can be established. It is whether the new arrangement strengthens representative government or replaces it with indirect control over natural resources of the region. A council that lacks public confidence may become another source of friction rather than a means of stabilisation – unlikely to deliver lasting peace and meet public aspirations.
The people of the former tribal districts have already experienced major changes in their administrative status, repeated security operations and prolonged instability. They need functioning courts, accountable policing, representative local government, security from militant violence and a fair share of the region’s resources.
Ultimately, three questions remain unanswered. Will the council strengthen the political and constitutional integration achieved in 2018, or weaken it in practice? Will it help reduce militancy through public cooperation and accountable civilian institutions, or merely add another layer of administration? And will the region’s mineral wealth benefit its people, or deepen their distrust of the state? Until the authorities provide clear answers, doubts about the purpose and legitimacy of the new arrangement are likely to persist.
