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The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
Iran’s spectacular resilience, perceptually at least, has redefined Middle Eastern security calculus. And without stretching it too far, a humbled US is happy with Iran checkmating a berserk, out of control and arrogantly unthankful Israel – a pariah complicit in murderous ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. However, as I have repeatedly asserted, Tehran’s consequent advantage is temporary and transient. And Iran’s accrued gains are negatively relevant. Therefore, the Islamic regime needs to recalibrate and re-orient.
Firstly, the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). To quote from elsewhere, ‘Iran leveraged [its] geography to irk and pique the World as a tool of coercive diplomacy.’ The world, with the exception of Pakistan, did not come to rescue Iran as it expected. And the international outcry was due to Tehran holding the world economy by the neck. The negativity and temporariness of this newfound relevance should not be lost on Iranian decision-makers.
Theoretically speaking, even if Oman-Iran joint sovereignty over SoH is internationally accepted (unlikely), its benefit in terms of shipping and passage clout, international influence and levies/taxes in whatever form, will be little and not worth the cost Tehran and Muscat will pay in International Relations. The around 22 million barrels per day of oil that flows through SoH constitute around 85% petroleum needs of Asia (China, South Korea, Japan, India, etc). The strait’s closure negligibly affects Israel and the oil-exporting US.
Leaving this huge slab (85% or so) untaxed due to friendly ties and other dependencies on these nations provides negligible financial advantage to Tehran. And taxing this slab invites retaliatory levies from these countries, as China is Iran’s largest trading and geostrategic partner, India sells it agricultural products and pharmaceuticals, Japan exports it specialised components like vehicle engines, industrial machinery, etc, and South Korea provides Tehran technology, industrial input, etc. Taxing Qatar’s LNG would affect the fattest regional purse, as Doha reportedly holds around $12 billion of frozen Iranian assets and is a likely major contributor to the $300 billion ‘War Reparation Fund’ to help Iran rebuild.
Besides, there is vigorous ‘pursuit of alternatives’ by SoH-dependent GCC nations to optimally utilise the existing pipeline network bypassing the strait – construct more pipelines; truck petroleum products overland elsewhere (Syria); enhance global oil storage, etc. Arab nations would never again allow any Iranian blackmail given the ill-considered blockade of their petroleum exports and the military attacks they endured. And then, there is vigorous R&D for green energy, away from fossil fuels, focused on storage batteries and panel prices, etc. So, the advantage of strait regulation that IRGC/Pasdaran is so obsessed with may not be as big, once the dust settles down. Hence Tehran needs to reconsider how far it can push on this front.
Secondly, the role of IRGC in sustenance of the Iranian resolve. Kudos and full marks, to say the least, but beyond war fighting, things must be left to the politicians. As mentioned earlier, soldiers and generals see things in the binary of black and white by virtue of their training and their professional needs. Grey is political stuff, better left to the politicians, giving them some allowance that they can be wrong sometimes.
Additionally, Generals too afraid of their combat legacy and performance, would, at times, take uncompromising positions that may not benefit the country. IRGC’s tenacity, resilience and war strategy is appreciated and well acknowledged, as imposing a caution on the US-Israel Combine leaves them on the ‘perceptual’ victory stand, but then Iran is more important than continued resistance, obstinacy and the appearance of victory, whatsoever. Preserving whatever is left after the bombing, rebuilding, reviving the economy, getting out of the web of sanctions should be Tehran’s unmistakable priorities.
Thirdly, the use of 3H proxies (Hamas, Houthis and Hezbollah). Hamas recently relented in governing Gaza for greater Palestinian reconciliation, long after Hamas’s reprehensible attacks in Israel on October 7, 2023, the main reason for this extended war. Hezbollah is down but not out, and it still impedes and sidesteps the Lebanese government, undermines its military by being a state within a state, and is increasingly seen as a part of the problem and not a solution, due to Israel’s dipropionate and brutal response to its stand-off attacks on Northern Israel. Likewise, Houthis are hampering Yemeni unity and politics.
So, yes, the strategy of ‘Forward Defence’ helped Iran/IRGC yield more influence in the ME and protected it against Israeli retaliation. It also strained it economically and created a chasm with the Arab Middle East, from GCC to Saudi Arabia, from Lebanon to Syria and with Shia Iraq. Tehran after a comprehensive peace settlement would do well to reassure its Arab neighbours against undue meddling in their affairs and abstain from supporting non-state actors.
Fourthly, political reform. In times of crisis, the Iranian nation stood behind the clergy, as in crises people jell together irrespective of politics. The venerable Khamenei was laid to rest with visible protocol and choreography, demonstrating regime popularity and control. However, this apparent sense of unity temporarily hides massive public discontent, that has surfaced in Iranian cities from time to time. ‘Reformists’ within the political right today have apparently surrendered to the ‘Fundamentalists’, who continue to champion cliches like the ‘axis of resistance’, believe in rigid ideological discipline, promote centralised ‘resistance economy’, and prioritise absolute authority of the clerics (Vilayat-e-Faqih). In the AI-driven, 21st Century, Iran deserves better. So, a change from above would be far better than an explosion from below.
Fifthly, the mantra of civilisational superiority, popular resilience and military indomitability would not make Iran strong, safe and secure. Feeling of being rediscovered by the world in ‘negative relevance’ is as good as it gets. Today, Iran’s strategic position is defined by aggressive posturing hiding massive structural damage from war. The regime is relying upon ‘blaster bravado’ to preserve its leverage against public isolation. Geostrategically speaking, Tehran’s complete maritime control is questionable, its domestic resilience is not invincible, its coercive strategic relevance is mauled, and the continued sanctions are biting it hard.
So, where does Iran go from here. Towards war and continued economic ruin, or a compromised peace under Reformists, that is good for all, and where Tehran checkmates Irael.
