AS Pakistan and China celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations, an important question emerges that goes beyond symbolism: what direction will the relationship take in a rapidly changing world and regional order?
No longer merely a rising power, China is now in the ranks of global superpowers alongside America. This transformation has profound implications for Pakistan. Sharing borders with an emerging superpower presents opportunities, dependencies, pressures and strategic dilemmas that Pakistan has never experienced before.
Pakistan’s long association with the US has seen fluctuating phases of cooperation, mistrust and transactional alignments. Geographic distance was a critical factor that allowed Pakistan to have divergent strategic priorities. Washington not only tolerated it but also took advantage whenever needed. But with China, it is a different story.
The relationship is rooted in strategic convergence, regional connectivity, defence cooperation and political trust developed over decades. Yet China’s rise has transformed the nature of this partnership as the China with which Pakistan built its early ties during the Cold War era is not the same today. Beijing’s global ambitions, economic priorities and security concerns have expanded, compelling Pakistan to revisit ways of sustaining strategic closeness while preserving diplomatic flexibility in an increasingly polarised world.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is in Beijing on a four-day state visit, accompanied by senior government and military officials, with expectations that Sino-Pak ties will remain on the same trajectory despite the occasional friction. Most concerns revolve around security issues and threats faced by Chinese nationals working on various projects, particularly CPEC-related, in Pakistan.
Although both countries share the goal of a terrorism-free neighbourhood and their views broadly converge on Afghanistan, there are differences over how to address the problem. Pakistan has drastically altered its Afghanistan policy in recent years, while China has maintained a relatively consistent and pragmatic approach, preferring engagement, mediation and gradual stabilisation.
China’s rise has transformed the nature of the Sino-Pak partnership.
Pakistan’s geopolitical thinking has historically followed a realist framework, largely shaped by its long partnership with Washington. Alliances such as Seato and Cento, followed by cooperation during the Afghan wars, created the foundation of that relationship. Military training programmes and security cooperation further institutionalised this approach under which Pakistan pragmatically calculated its interests and maintained working relations with Washington despite recurring mistrust and divergent priorities.
Pakistan moved closer to China after the downturn in US-Pakistan relations following the Osama bin Laden operation in May 2011 and the Salala border incident, when Nato forces attacked Pakistani military border posts in the Salala area of Mohmand Agency in November 2011. The launch of CPEC further cemented ties. However, neither Islamabad nor Rawalpindi ultimately abandoned the balancing approach between Washington and Beijing. Pakistan still depends on China for strategic cover, defence cooperation and financial support, while simultaneously relying on the US-led economic order for exports, international financial institutions and macroeconomic stability.
This balancing act has not weakened Pakistan’s ties with Beijing but has altered their character. Unlike the US, China has rarely pressured Pakistan publicly to choose sides or adopt bloc politics; it has, instead, quietly adjusted its own expectations and vocabulary, gradually shifting from describing Pakistan as an ‘all-weather friend’ to a ‘trusted strategic partner’.
At the same time, the relationship has undergone a subtle but important change, with the earlier optimism regarding CPEC and expectations of an economic breakthrough increasingly giving way to a more realistic understanding of mutual interests and limitations. CPEC itself symbolises both the achievements and limitations of the partnership. It helped address Pakistan’s energy shortages and infrastructure gaps, but the promise of structural economic transformation is only partially fulfilled. Today, the Sino-Pak partnership is more security-driven, more unequal economically, and more strategically consequential.
The future trajectory of the relationship appears less centred on grand economic promises and more on concrete strategic cooperation, including defence integration, counterterrorism coordination, industrial cooperation, mining, agriculture, technology and regional connectivity.
Defence ties have deepened to an unprecedented level, with China accounting for the overwhelming majority of Pakistan’s arms imports, while cooperation now extends to co-production, intelligence sharing, naval modernisation, and long-term defence-industrial integration.
Pakistan’s internal security has also emerged as the most sensitive dimension of bilateral ties. Beijing is increasingly concerned about attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC-linked projects, and its tolerance is now shaped less by Pakistan’s relations with Washington and more by Islamabad’s ability to protect Chinese interests and maintain policy consistency.
Although China repeatedly reaffirms support for Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability, there is still no evidence of a formal Nato-style mutual defence guarantee between the two countries. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s strategic dependence on China continues to deepen, making it increasingly difficult for Islamabad to maintain a genuinely equidistant posture between Beijing and Washington.
However, Pakistan has sought alternative avenues to preserve this balance. Its expanding role in Gulf security affairs, evolving defence partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt, participation in President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives, though currently dormant, and its mediation role in the US-Iran war have opened up diplomatic space for Islamabad to sustain strategic flexibility. The idea of emerging middle-power alignments is also gaining greater significance in the state’s strategic thinking.
However, one question is likely to re-emerge: how will China view Pakistan, a close neighbour that continues to maintain ties with its principal rival, the US?
China possesses several strategic cards, and the one that concerns Pakistan most is the ‘India card’. Yet Islamabad appears confident that India faces broader strategic constraints in evolving an exclusive partnership with China similar to its historical relationship with Russia.
India’s strategic and geo-economic DNA also aligns more naturally with the West, a reality — and an advantage for Pakistan — that Islamabad will continue attempting to challenge within the broader regional competition.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2026
