The Lost Year – Sp Supplements

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As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma.

LAST year, while reflecting on the events of 2023, one thing had seemed certain: the order being foisted onto the country would not guarantee the stability Pakistan desperately sought. But, with general elections around the corner, there had been hope that a democratic reset may set the country on the right path. Alas, it was not to be. Instead, 2024 has left one wondering whether the nation may be trapped in some Sisyphean nightmare, doomed to re-enact the most troubling highlights of its 77-year existence over and over.

Many among the older generation used to complain that Pakistan’s youth have very little appreciation of the political and social turmoil they witnessed in the past. This thinking used to manifest in the comparisons often drawn between the present day and the Ziaul Haq era. Those comparisons have recently stopped. As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma, having seen much of it reprised firsthand.

Over the course of 2024, they were brought to terms with the notion that laws and rules be damned, “power is power”. They realised just how unjust Pakistan’s justice system can be, and how ugly electoral transitions can become. They finally understood how easily manipulable the state’s institutions are and how superficial the systems of checks and balances on their power. The year also saw a resurgence in terrorist activity, with violent incidents escalating in both scope and impact over the year.

Though the surge in terrorist activity threatened to undo much of the gains Pakistan had made over the years and even imperil the future of economic cooperation with global partners, both the government and the security apparatus seemed much more concerned with social media and the internet, especially the danger from “digital terrorism”. As a result of such concerns, internet services were periodically disrupted on one ‘national security’ pretext or the other. There was little observable impact of these interventions on terrorist activity, however, which continued uninterrupted throughout the year.

As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma.

Judicial collapse

The Supreme Court’s year began with several high-profile cases of a political nature, most prominent among which were appeals against the lifetime disqualification of lawmakers, as well as the infamous ‘bat symbol’ case. A favourable ruling in the former allowed PML-N supremo Nawaz Sharif to finally hope for a fourth stint as prime minister; the latter case would be used to all but knock out his primary challenge, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), from the election altogether.

The same judgement was used unlawfully by the ECP to deny the PTI’s status as a parliamentary party and, subsequently, to rob it of the reserved seats it was entitled to. The SC’s failure to intervene at this moment would later trigger a stand-off over the reserved seats and, ultimately, split the court. The failure to prevent abuse of the judgement also provided the coalition government enough time and opportunity to tamper with the Constitution. This feat was eventually accomplished in the form of the 26th Amendment, which put paid to judicial independence by splitting the court’s powers and having the government pick and choose its senior-most officers.

The SC, under Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, also failed to address serious complaints regarding the interference of intelligence agencies in judicial affairs. Though several instances of this alleged interference were brought to light in a formal complaint, the matter remained unresolved till the end of the year. Likewise, the legality of military trials for civilians — which a SC bench had settled last year, though the verdict was suspended — could not be decided, with stop-gap measures taken twice to provide band-aid ‘relief’ to those being held in military custody while the entire legality of their detention remained in question.

Chief Justice Isa’s tenure drew to an ignominious end: his bold judgement in the Mubarak Sani case was meekly ‘corrected’ by his own hand after a strong reaction from religious leaders. He failed to uphold the SC’s verdict in the reserved seats case and then undermined it by declaring it ‘non-implementable’. He endorsed an ordinance that reversed the same Practice and Procedures Bill that he had made a fuss about before assuming power, and which he had made it a point to take up as his first case as chief justice.

He would use this ordinance to appoint a handpicked bench to reverse a previous ruling on the validity of votes cast in special cases by defectors. The circumstances triggered speculation that, for the first time ever, a chief justice may also be interested in an extension.

Electoral farce

The signs hadn’t been promising as Pakistan neared the February general election. Contrary to expectations, however, the people of Pakistan delivered a verdict on Feb 8 that completely upset the picture. The PTI, though much was done to ensure its failure, pulled ahead in early results and seemed headed for an unprecedented victory. Late night on election day, the PML-N, which had organised a ceremony to celebrate its victory, quietly told reporters to pack up and return.

Hours later, the ECP’s results system once again experienced a catastrophic failure, and the nation woke on Feb 9 to a vastly different scenario than the one they had expected based on the projections on their TV screens just a few hours earlier. The results continued to shift over the next few days.

Unsurprisingly, the losing candidates and various election observers cried foul over what they alleged was blatant engineering to change the results. It is worth pointing out that the rigging controversy was never settled, and election tribunals have, to date, not decided the bulk of election petitions even though legal deadlines lapsed months earlier.

Throughout this fiasco, the Election Commission’s role remained highly questionable. It may be recalled that the ECP had already delayed holding elections for almost a full year, in direct contravention of constitutional edicts, arguing that it needed time to prepare to deliver an election that was free, fair, impartial and inclusive. The actual conduct of the belated 2024 general election was a far cry from even the most concessionary interpretation of those requirements.

The ECP not only endorsed a slew of measures taken by the state that interrupted and complicated the exercise, but it also later took several illegal decisions that directly and seriously affected electoral outcomes. As if this was not enough, the ECP also actively blocked the appointment of additional election tribunals for Punjab and even moved petitions from one tribunal to another in Islamabad when it seemed like its results could be overturned. Finally, it outright disobeyed the SC’s clear and repeated instructions in the reserved seats case, and the majority judgement remains unimplemented to this date.

A political recession

First responders and security officials at the site of the blast targeting Chinese engineers outside Karachi airport in October. — White Star/File

Since the PTI refused to accept the full election results, the PPP and PML-N found themselves forced into a shotgun wedding. Under their agreement, the PPP took most of the constitutional posts and none of the responsibility for the government’s performance. The prime ministership fell once again to Shehbaz Sharif, who seemed eager enough to reprise his old role.

The government, hounded by doubts over its legitimacy, mired itself deeper into controversy by repeatedly reaching for problematic measures to ensure its survival. Legislative interventions in this regard included tinkering with laws pertaining to election tribunals, and then a law to prevent reserved seats from being given to the PTI. To further block the PTI, parliament also enacted laws making it difficult to hold protests. Meanwhile, the government frequently imposed blanket prohibitions on public gatherings and political activity and, at one point, introduced a short-lived proposal to ban the PTI outright. Thankfully, it found few takers for this ‘solution’.

Meanwhile, the PTI continued on the path of chaotic confrontation, launching protest after protest without clear direction or even full buy-in from its on-ground leaders. The party appeared rudderless and prone to infighting, often attacking its own with the same zeal with which it attacks others. It continued to make much noise while having nothing of substance to offer and seemed to be pulled in different directions as it struggled to figure out its political future.

State of insecurity

Despite the announcement of another major counterterrorism initiative (Azm-i-Istehkam) in the middle of the year, the Pakistani state clearly struggled to contain the growing threat from militancy and terrorism. Violent attacks occurred throughout the year with alarming regularity, resulting in an escalating body count that continued piling up in the last days of December.

According to statistics shared by the Ministry of Interior, there were 1,566 terrorism-related incidents in the country in the first 10 months of 2024, which resulted in 924 deaths and 2,121 injuries. Of the total casualties, security personnel accounted for 573 deaths and 1,353 injured. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bore the brunt of the violence, accounting for 948 and 582 attacks, respectively. Most of the deaths of security personnel took place in KP, where 437 of the 573 were martyred.

Attacks on foreign workers were a cause for major alarm. Chinese expats were targeted in two high-profile attacks: the first occurred in Bisham early in the year and resulted in the deaths of five Chinese nationals working on the Dasu dam project. Then, on Oct 6, a suicide attack right outside the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi resulted in the deaths of three, including two Chinese nationals, just a week before a high-profile Shanghai Cooperation Organisation conference in Islamabad.

Apart from this, there was also a foiled suicide bomb-and-gun attack on Japanese workers in Karachi in April. The Japanese workers thankfully remained unharmed, but a guard and two bystanders were injured.

The media’s capitulation

It is most unfortunate that, on most occasions in this fraught year, the Pakistani media appeared incapable of serving the public interest. A large part of this may be attributed to the fact that the state continued to exert significant pressure on national media, either by direct interference in editorial activities through fear tactics and coercion or by abusing public funds to reward and penalise media houses through government advertisements.

Voices critical of state excesses were thus stifled and suffocated, and various tactics, like arrests and disappearances of journalists, were used to attempt to strike fear among those who continued to resist. On the other hand, those who agreed to ‘cooperate’ were lavished with state funds, resources and grants. The media’s abdication of its responsibility to the people continued to erode public trust, leading to more people relying on social media for their information.

Prognosis

As the year ended, there was hope, too, of a reset in the political situation, with major political parties seemingly moving towards a dialogue. Although optimism for the success of such initiatives has now worn thin, one still holds out hope that the stakeholders will finally see sense.

The realisation increasingly is that there needs to be a pullback from the present state. As it is, the struggle between the PTI, the ruling coalition and the security establishment has consumed much time and national resources while hollowing out the political structure from within.

Still, the only viable way out of the crisis lies through a political ceasefire and negotiation on some ground rules for how matters proceed hereafter. How, and most importantly, when this will happen is important. Much is predicated on the coming few weeks, with a leadership change thousands of miles to the west expected by some to trigger key changes over here.

Chasing such dreams would be unwise, however. Pakistan needs indigenous solutions to the problems it has created for itself. Before it does so, it cannot escape this regressive cycle.

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The Lost Year – Sp Supplements

As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma. LAST year, while reflecting on the events of

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