THERE is an immediate need for Pakistan to overhaul its Afghanistan policy, since the present one has failed to yield positive results. The Taliban regime in Kabul has not responded to pressure from Pakistan to neutralise the terrorist groups that are operating from Afghan soil. Nor has it appeared willing to improve regional geo-economic cooperation. Even pressure in the form of the imposition of duties on transit trade by Pakistan, that has significantly reduced trade, has failed to do the trick: the Taliban have remained indifferent, and have also resisted calls from their traders to engage in talks with Pakistan.
In an effort to secure cooperation, Pakistan has resorted to various economically and diplomatically coercive measures to counter the threat posed by the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. However, the Afghan Taliban have maintained their hard-line stance — despite the decline in their country’s trade numbers by $54 million in the first half of the current year, thanks to measures adopted by Pakistan such as border closures, increased regional taxes, and higher tariffs. These measures have disrupted the transit of Afghan products to markets like India. The Taliban approach is consistent with their old position and they are offering nothing more than facilitating a dialogue between Pakistan and the TTP — a strategy that carries significant risks for Pakistan’s internal security and national cohesion.
Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts have also fallen short, highlighting a growing disconnect between its expectations and the Taliban’s rigid positions on security, geopolitics, and economic issues. This has undermined Pakistan’s credibility, especially with regard to its ability to exercise some influence over the Taliban to advocate for issues such as Afghan women’s right to access education and employment, which continue to plummet to alarming levels.
Moreover, Pakistan has still not identified useful diplomatic tools and skilled diplomats who could plug the growing gap between the two countries. It simply continues to reshuffle the same people who have yet to achieve the diplomatic outcomes desired by this country. This has only made the crisis worse.
Pakistan has yet to identify useful diplomatic tools to plug the growing gap with Afghanistan.
It must be a matter of some concern that Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban is decreasing, conversely resulting in the Taliban’s leverage over Pakistan getting a boost, particularly in the context of security. Without cooperation from Afghanistan, it is increasingly difficult to address terrorism and insurgency in Balochistan. These issues are becoming more complex, with a 27 per cent increase in terrorist attacks reported last month compared to the previous month — a trend that has persisted for several months now. KP’s merged tribal districts have become hotspots for violence, with the southern districts and areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border particularly vulnerable, as evidenced by frequent cross-border attacks and local anti-militant protests. The TTP has speeded up its cross-border violence and in Kurram district, the Taliban and TTP have exploited sectarian and tribal tensions to establish their foothold, especially in Lower Kurram.
The Baloch insurgents’ use of Afghan soil exacerbates the worsening security situation in Balochistan. While other factors are also responsible for the instability in KP and Balochistan, the role of Afghanistan and the Taliban is critical in this. Pakistan’s internal security challenges will persist without an effective Afghan policy grounded in cooperation on the economic, security, and regional political fronts. Military campaigns, whether small or large-scale, will likely prove ineffective without a comprehensive reassessment of Pakistan’s current Afghan policy.
The Taliban’s relations with their Central Asian neighbours are comparatively stable, as well as with Russia and China, which has encouraged the Taliban leadership to assert itself vis-à-vis Pakistan. Now, the Taliban are more interested in transnational mega development projects, which will strengthen their position and allow them to balance their economic and political relations with Pakistan. The Taliban regime is particularly jubilant about the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India project, the necessary machinery for which has arrived in Afghanistan; the project is expected to be completed in two years.
The Taliban are also trying to restructure their relationship with India for multiple purposes, but mainly to balance their relations with Pakistan. However, their source of strength and confidence are Russia and China, both of which want to counter American influence in the region and gain their cooperation for counterterrorism (CT) purposes.
Pakistan has several options to address the challenges it faces, including developing regional CT cooperation beyond the limited scope of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework. Strategically, Pakistan can reduce Afghanistan’s leverage in transnational energy and economic infrastructure projects by ensuring it is not the end-user destination for such initiatives. However, Pakistan’s options are constrained: Iran remains under sanctions, complicating the execution of gas pipeline projects; China has multiple channels with Central Asia and can utilise shorter routes via the Wakhan Corridor if necessary; and India, aware of the political and strategic challenges of these projects, remains a complex partner. Still, Pakistan can look into CBMs with its eastern neighbour to address mutual concerns.
Negotiating with the TTP is not a viable solution and risks escalating the conflicts that are ongoing in the tribal districts. Internally, Pakistan must address the pressing issues in KP and Balochistan using an inclusive approach, and focusing on equitable development, fair resource distribution as per constitutional rights, and the restoration of these provinces’ dignity and political participation. Afghanistan can be a partner in this exercise. Trade routes can be operationalised, increasing cross-border trade flows, and establishing educational and medical centres near the border to aid Afghan nationals. Such steps could help boost trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and provide the latter the leverage with which to persuade the Taliban to end their support to the TTP and other terrorist groups.
Effective diplomacy with Afghanistan is crucial, but it requires a new approach, and merely reshuffling faces will not work. Strong diplomacy needs strong policy objectives. Pakistan must critically review its Afghanistan policy since the Taliban’s rise to power, identifying what has worked and what has not while prioritising the country’s broader geopolitical and economic interests.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, December 8th, 2024
