THE dynamics of terrorism threats in Pakistan have shifted significantly since the Taliban took control in Afghanistan, challenging security institutions to develop an effective strategy to address these risks.
The current counterterrorism strategy is seemingly based on a zero-tolerance approach towards all terrorist groups, including religiously motivated terrorists and insurgents. However, this approach has yet to yield productive outcomes, and it has heightened security concerns, especially for foreign nationals in the country. Chinese nationals, in particular, have been targeted twice within six months, and a convoy of foreign diplomats narrowly escaped an attack while visiting Swat in KP. China, facing specific security concerns, has been urging Pakistan to intensify its efforts against terrorist groups that threaten its interests.
China has been using high-level diplomatic channels to convey its security concerns to the Pakistani leadership, initially pushing the latter to announce a comprehensive campaign against terrorism and extremism under the tag of ‘Operation Azm-i-Istehkam’ and then recently by pressuring Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif to announce that he would personally oversee the investigation into last month’s terrorist attack on Chinese nationals in Karachi.
However, these assurances from Pakistan have done little to ease Beijing’s concerns. A recent statement by the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, is a reflection of this frustration. At a public seminar, Ambassador Zaidong rebuffed Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, rejecting his praise of China’s patience amid security threats. He stated unequivocally that two deadly attacks within six months were unacceptable and urged the Pakistani government to launch a comprehensive crackdown on all anti-China terrorist groups.
What can Pakistan do to address the Chinese concerns? What has Operation Azm-i-Istehkam achieved so far, and how sustainable is the campaign? These questions are essential, especially with regard to interpreting the Chinese demand for decisive action against the terrorists. Suppose it is conceived that full-scale military operations in Balochistan and KP eliminate the terrorist networks. This is a critical demand, as full-scale military operations are not viable.
What can Pakistan do to address the Chinese concerns?
It has been argued on these pages that any large-scale military operation in Balochistan would complicate the province’s political and security crisis, and there is a need to adopt a very delicate approach. For threats such as those emanating from the likes of the banned TTP and the ISKP, Pakistan needs full cooperation from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which the Taliban are resisting by helping the TTP instead. The alternative is cross-border action to eliminate the threats, which would have its own political and security implications, and will further strengthen the bond between the Taliban and TTP.
If China understands Pakistan’s position on the non-viability of military operations, what should the other options be? China seems to want deeper cooperation in the security sector. The ongoing formal cooperation between the two countries is not producing enough trust, so China has proposed a joint security mechanism.
Media reports reveal that during Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s recent visit, a proposal for a joint security mechanism was discussed as a critical condition for securing major infrastructure and energy deals with Pakistan. A vital outcome of the visit was signing agreements to provide Pakistan’s law enforcement, tasked with protecting Chinese nationals, with six bulletproof vehicles and approximately 20 firefighting trucks.
Pakistan has not been in favour of a formal Chinese security presence within its borders, having itself developed extensive infrastructure to secure CPEC and protect Chinese nationals. We have mentioned in an earlier column, too, that in 2016, the Special Security Division was established, comprising 34 and 44 Light Infantry Divisions, with 15,000 troops each. According to some reports, the 34 Light Division was created in 2016, followed by the 44 Light Division in 2020. The SSD is also supported by 32,000 security personnel from the Frontier Corps, police, and Levies. There is reportedly a dedicated intelligence network to detect and eliminate terrorism-related threats. Despite this robust security infrastructure, attacks on Chinese nationals have persisted.
Notably, no terrorist attacks have been reported at project sites. Except for the 2018 assault on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, all recorded attacks have occurred while Chinese workers were travelling between locations.
In response to the Dasu attack on a bus carrying Chinese workers, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to the safety of Chinese nationals by tightening standard operating procedures and adding extra security layers. Responsibilities for police forces have been extended down to the district level, with district administrations and provincial governments required to review security plans for Chinese nationals monthly, alter travel routes, and implement other precautionary measures. An investigation will determine whether provincial and district administrations have been vigilant in ensuring the safety of Chinese nationals. According to the SOPs, Chinese nationals must travel in B-6-level armoured vehicles to minimise risks.
The October attack on Chinese nationals in Karachi highlighted vulnerabilities within security institutions and exposed lapses in SOP enforcement. While details about the joint security mechanism between China and Pakistan remain limited, it is seen as a possibility that Chinese private security companies may become involved in providing inner-circle security for Chinese workers, a step that would respect Pakistan’s sovereignty. One can imagine this would be an initial step, and if security threats were not prevented, the cooperation would go deeper.
The issue lies not in the sincerity and dedication of Pakistan’s law enforcement but in their capacity and access to effective surveillance equipment, which could make a significant difference. With more substantial resources, Pakistan might have been able to avoid the need for a joint security mechanism. Now, it appears increasingly difficult to avert this initiative. Pakistan can, however, aim to confine the joint security mechanism to specific areas while ensuring that the SSD and other law enforcement agencies maintain maximum compliance with the SOPs they have developed to protect foreign nationals.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, November 3rd, 2024
